deytenit
6463bad5ee
- Purge misplaced RFCs, scratch tokens, and node-proprietary assets - Decouple remote provisioning to ci/scripts/init-node.py - Add targeted composition orchestration in actions/compose.py - Add host-side Xray stale socket cleanup in /dev/shm - Add actions/env.py for shell exports and .env synchronization - Harden UFW, backup retention, host tempfiles, and notify dispatcher - Add pyproject.toml and Makefile with 78 passing unit tests
559 lines
27 KiB
Python
559 lines
27 KiB
Python
"""Protected SSH handover with a separately locked, persistent rollback timer."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import argparse
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import base64
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import fcntl
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import fnmatch
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import hashlib
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import ipaddress
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import json
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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import pwd
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import re
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import shlex
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import stat
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import tempfile
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import time
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class AccessError(RuntimeError):
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pass
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def include_arguments(value):
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arguments, word, quote, started = [], [], None, False
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for character in value:
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if character == '\\':
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raise AccessError('Escaped SSH Include paths require manual reconciliation')
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if quote:
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if character == quote:
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quote = None
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else:
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word.append(character)
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elif character in ('"', "'"):
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quote, started = character, True
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elif character in ' \t\r':
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if started:
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arguments.append(''.join(word))
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word, started = [], False
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elif character == '#' and not started:
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break
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else:
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word.append(character)
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started = True
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if quote:
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raise AccessError('Unclosed SSH Include quote requires manual reconciliation')
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if started:
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arguments.append(''.join(word))
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if not arguments or len(arguments) > 128 or any(not item or len(item) > 4096 for item in arguments):
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raise AccessError('Unsupported SSH Include paths require manual reconciliation')
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return arguments
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class Host:
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def __init__(self, root=Path('/'), runner=subprocess.run):
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self.root = Path(root).resolve()
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self.runner = runner
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def path(self, path):
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return self.root / path.lstrip('/')
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def command(self, args, check=True):
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result = self.runner(args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)
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if check and result.returncode:
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raise AccessError('Access command failed: ' + args[0])
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return result
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def boot_id(self):
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return self.path('/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id').read_text().strip()
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def fingerprint(self):
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digest = hashlib.sha256()
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paths = [self.path('/etc/ssh/sshd_config'), self.path('/etc/default/ssh')]
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for directory in ('/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d', '/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d',
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'/run/systemd/system/ssh.service.d', '/usr/lib/systemd/system/ssh.service.d',
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'/lib/systemd/system/ssh.service.d'):
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paths += sorted(self.path(directory).glob('*.conf'))
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for path in paths:
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digest.update(str(path.relative_to(self.root)).encode())
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digest.update(path.read_bytes() if path.exists() else b'<absent>')
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return digest.hexdigest()
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def unconditional_configuration(self):
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remaining, directory_entries, visited = 1024 * 1024, 0, set()
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def expand(pattern):
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nonlocal directory_entries
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if any(token in pattern for token in ('[:', '[.', '[=', '[^')):
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raise AccessError('Extended SSH Include glob syntax requires manual reconciliation')
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absolute = pattern if pattern.startswith('/') else '/etc/ssh/' + pattern
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mapped = self.path(absolute)
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if len(mapped.parts) > 64:
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raise AccessError('SSH Include path exceeds supported limits; manual reconciliation required')
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candidates = [Path(mapped.anchor)]
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for component in mapped.parts[1:]:
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expanded = []
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for parent in candidates:
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if not any(character in component for character in '*?['):
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candidate = parent / component
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if os.path.lexists(candidate):
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expanded.append(candidate)
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continue
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try:
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with os.scandir(parent) as entries:
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for entry in entries:
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directory_entries += 1
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if directory_entries > 4096:
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raise AccessError('SSH Include traversal exceeds supported limits; manual reconciliation required')
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if entry.name.startswith('.') and not component.startswith('.'):
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continue
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if fnmatch.fnmatchcase(entry.name, component):
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expanded.append(Path(entry.path))
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except (FileNotFoundError, NotADirectoryError):
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continue
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if len(expanded) > 128:
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raise AccessError('SSH Include expansion exceeds supported limits; manual reconciliation required')
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candidates = expanded
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return sorted(candidates)
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def inspect(path, ancestors):
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nonlocal remaining
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information = path.stat()
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identity = (information.st_dev, information.st_ino)
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if identity in ancestors or len(ancestors) >= 16:
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raise AccessError('Recursive SSH Include configuration requires manual reconciliation')
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if identity in visited:
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return
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if len(visited) >= 128 or not stat.S_ISREG(information.st_mode) or information.st_size > remaining:
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raise AccessError('SSH configuration exceeds supported inspection limits; manual reconciliation required')
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visited.add(identity)
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with path.open('rb') as stream:
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content = stream.read(remaining + 1)
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remaining -= len(content)
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if remaining < 0:
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raise AccessError('SSH configuration exceeds supported inspection limits; manual reconciliation required')
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for line in content.decode().splitlines():
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line = line.lstrip()
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if not line or line.startswith('#'):
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continue
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if line.startswith('"'):
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keyword, separator, value = line[1:].partition('"')
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if not separator:
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raise AccessError('Unsupported SSH keyword quoting requires manual reconciliation')
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else:
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parsed = re.match(r'([^\s=]+)(.*)', line)
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if not parsed:
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raise AccessError('Unsupported SSH configuration syntax requires manual reconciliation')
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keyword, value = parsed.groups()
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value = value.lstrip()
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if value.startswith('='):
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value = value[1:]
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if keyword.lower() == 'match':
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raise AccessError('SSH Match directives require manual reconciliation before initialization')
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if keyword.lower() != 'include':
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continue
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for pattern in include_arguments(value):
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for included in expand(pattern):
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inspect(included, ancestors | {identity})
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try:
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inspect(self.path('/etc/ssh/sshd_config'), set())
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except (OSError, UnicodeError) as exc:
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raise AccessError('Cannot inspect SSH configuration and includes; manual reconciliation required') from exc
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def bootstrap_preflight(self):
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for activity in ('is-active', 'is-enabled'):
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if self.command(['systemctl', activity, '--quiet', 'ssh.socket'], False).returncode == 0:
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raise AccessError('SSH socket activation requires manual handover; no access changes made')
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if self.command(['systemctl', 'is-active', '--quiet', 'ssh.service'], False).returncode:
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raise AccessError('An active ssh.service is required')
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mode = self.command(['systemctl', 'show', 'ssh.service', '-p', 'KillMode', '--value']).stdout.strip()
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if mode != 'process':
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raise AccessError('ssh.service must preserve established sessions with KillMode=process')
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arguments = self.service_arguments()
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managed = self.path('/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d/apex-init.conf')
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if managed.exists():
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commands = [line.removeprefix('ExecStart=') for line in managed.read_text().splitlines()
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if line.startswith('ExecStart=') and line != 'ExecStart=']
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if len(commands) != 1 or arguments != shlex.split(commands[0]):
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raise AccessError('Active SSH service configuration differs from its managed invocation')
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elif arguments != ['/usr/sbin/sshd', '-D']:
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raise AccessError('Custom SSH service invocation requires manual access reconciliation')
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defaults = self.path('/etc/default/ssh')
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if defaults.exists():
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for line in defaults.read_text().splitlines():
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if re.match(r'^\s*SSHD_OPTS\s*=', line):
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value = line.split('=', 1)[1].strip().strip('\"\'')
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if value:
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raise AccessError('Custom SSHD_OPTS require manual access reconciliation')
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self.unconditional_configuration()
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self.command(['/usr/sbin/sshd', '-t'])
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self.live_arguments()
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def preflight(self):
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self.bootstrap_preflight()
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self.command(['visudo', '-c'])
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self.command(['runuser', '-u', 'adam', '--', 'sudo', '-n', 'true'])
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def service_arguments(self):
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output = self.command(['systemctl', 'show', 'ssh.service', '-p', 'ExecStart', '--value']).stdout
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matches = re.findall(r'argv\[\]=([^;]+)', output)
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if len(matches) != 1:
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raise AccessError('Unable to verify the SSH service invocation')
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arguments = shlex.split(matches[0])
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# Debian's stock unit has this optional variable. Its actual expansion is
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# independently checked against /proc below, so a nonempty value fails.
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if arguments == ['/usr/sbin/sshd', '-D', '$SSHD_OPTS']:
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arguments.pop()
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if not arguments or arguments[0] != '/usr/sbin/sshd':
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raise AccessError('SSH service does not invoke the supported daemon')
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return arguments
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def live_arguments(self):
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expected = self.service_arguments()
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pid = self.command(['systemctl', 'show', 'ssh.service', '-p', 'MainPID', '--value']).stdout.strip()
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if not pid.isdecimal() or int(pid) <= 1:
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raise AccessError('SSH service has no verifiable active listener process')
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process = self.path('/proc/' + pid)
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try:
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if os.readlink(process / 'exe') != '/usr/sbin/sshd':
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raise AccessError('Active SSH process does not run the supported daemon')
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parts = [part for part in (process / 'cmdline').read_bytes().decode().split('\0') if part]
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except (OSError, UnicodeError):
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raise AccessError('Unable to inspect the active SSH listener invocation') from None
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if len(parts) == 1 and parts[0].startswith('sshd: ') and ' [listener]' in parts[0]:
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actual = shlex.split(parts[0][6:].split(' [listener]', 1)[0])
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else:
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actual = parts
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if actual != expected:
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raise AccessError('Running SSH listener differs from the active service invocation')
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return actual, pid
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def verify_active(self, ports, final, address):
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args, pid = self.live_arguments()
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self.verify_policy([arg for arg in args if arg != '-D'], ports, final, address)
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output = self.command(['ss', '-H', '-ltnp']).stdout
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actual_ports = set()
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for line in output.splitlines():
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if '("sshd",' not in line:
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continue
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if set(re.findall(r'pid=(\d+)', line)) != {pid}:
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raise AccessError('An additional SSH listener exists outside the managed service')
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fields = line.split()
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if len(fields) < 5 or not fields[3].rsplit(':', 1)[-1].isdecimal():
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raise AccessError('Unable to verify the active SSH listening sockets')
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actual_ports.add(int(fields[3].rsplit(':', 1)[-1]))
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if actual_ports != set(ports):
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raise AccessError('Active SSH listening ports differ from the declared policy')
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def policy(self, ports, final, address):
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args = ['/usr/sbin/sshd']
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for port in sorted(set(ports)):
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args += ['-p', str(port)]
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if final:
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for value in ('PermitRootLogin=no', 'PasswordAuthentication=no',
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'KbdInteractiveAuthentication=no', 'PubkeyAuthentication=yes',
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'AuthenticationMethods=publickey', 'AllowUsers=adam',
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'X11Forwarding=no', 'PermitEmptyPasswords=no'):
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args += ['-o', value]
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self.verify_policy(args, ports, final, address)
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return args
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def verify_policy(self, args, ports, final, address):
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self.unconditional_configuration()
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self.command(args + ['-t'])
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users = {'adam', 'root'}
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if final:
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users.update(account.pw_name for account in pwd.getpwall())
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for user in sorted(users):
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output = self.command(args + ['-T', '-C', f'user={user},host=localhost,addr={address}']).stdout
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values = {}
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for line in output.splitlines():
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key, _, value = line.partition(' ')
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values.setdefault(key, []).append(value)
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if set(values.get('port', [])) != {str(p) for p in ports}:
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raise AccessError('Effective SSH ports do not match the handover policy')
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if final and any(values.get(k) != [v] for k, v in {
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'permitrootlogin': 'no', 'passwordauthentication': 'no',
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'kbdinteractiveauthentication': 'no', 'pubkeyauthentication': 'yes',
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'authenticationmethods': 'publickey', 'allowusers': 'adam',
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'x11forwarding': 'no', 'permitemptypasswords': 'no'}.items()):
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raise AccessError('Effective SSH authentication policy is inconsistent')
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def current_final(self, address):
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try:
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self.verify_active([2222], True, address)
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return True
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except AccessError:
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return False
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def install_policy(self, ports, final, address):
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args = self.policy(ports, final, address)
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path = self.path('/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d/apex-init.conf')
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atomic(path, ('[Service]\nExecStart=\nExecStart=' + ' '.join(args + ['-D']) + '\n').encode(), 0o644)
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self.command(['systemctl', 'daemon-reload'])
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actual = self.command(['systemctl', 'show', 'ssh.service', '-p', 'ExecStart', '--value']).stdout
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match = re.search(r'argv\[\]=([^;]+)', actual)
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if not match or shlex.split(match[1]) != args + ['-D']:
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raise AccessError('Another service override prevents the managed SSH policy')
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self.command(['systemctl', 'restart', 'ssh.service'])
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self.verify_active(ports, final, address)
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def firewall_needed(self):
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result = self.command(['ufw', 'status'], False)
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if result.returncode or 'Status: active' not in result.stdout:
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return False
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if re.search(r'^2222/tcp(?:\s|\(v6\)).*ALLOW', result.stdout, re.MULTILINE):
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return False
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return True
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def open_firewall(self):
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# Existing allows remain owned by their administrator. Only our commented rule is removed.
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self.command(['ufw', 'allow', '2222/tcp', 'comment', 'apex-init-access'])
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def close_firewall(self):
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self.command(['ufw', '--force', 'delete', 'allow', '2222/tcp', 'comment', 'apex-init-access'])
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def arm(self):
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bundle = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
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if not re.fullmatch(r'/usr/local/lib/apex-provisioner/[a-f0-9]{64}', str(bundle)):
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raise AccessError('Access runner must execute from the installed root-owned bundle')
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service = ('[Unit]\nDescription=APEX pending access rollback\nAfter=local-fs.target\n'
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'[Service]\nType=oneshot\nWorkingDirectory=' + str(bundle) + '\n'
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'ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 -m engine.provisioning.access tick\n')
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timer = ('[Unit]\nDescription=APEX access rollback deadline and boot recovery\n'
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'[Timer]\nOnBootSec=5s\nOnUnitActiveSec=10s\nAccuracySec=1s\n'
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'[Install]\nWantedBy=timers.target\n')
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atomic(self.path('/etc/systemd/system/apex-access-rollback.service'), service.encode(), 0o644)
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atomic(self.path('/etc/systemd/system/apex-access-rollback.timer'), timer.encode(), 0o644)
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self.command(['systemctl', 'daemon-reload'])
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self.command(['systemctl', 'enable', '--now', 'apex-access-rollback.timer'])
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def disarm(self):
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self.command(['systemctl', 'disable', '--now', 'apex-access-rollback.timer'])
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def restore(self, state):
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path = self.path('/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d/apex-init.conf')
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if state['previous'] is None:
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path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
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else:
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atomic(path, base64.b64decode(state['previous']), 0o644)
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self.command(['/usr/sbin/sshd', '-t'])
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self.command(['systemctl', 'daemon-reload'])
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self.command(['systemctl', 'restart', 'ssh.service'])
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if state.get('firewall_added'):
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self.close_firewall()
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def atomic(path, data, mode=0o600):
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path = Path(path)
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for parent in [path, *path.parents]:
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if parent.is_symlink():
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raise AccessError('Refusing a symlink in a managed access path')
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path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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fd, temporary = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix='.apex-access-', dir=path.parent)
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try:
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with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as stream:
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os.fchmod(stream.fileno(), mode)
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stream.write(data)
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stream.flush()
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os.fsync(stream.fileno())
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os.replace(temporary, path)
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finally:
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if os.path.exists(temporary):
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os.unlink(temporary)
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directory = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY)
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try:
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os.fsync(directory)
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finally:
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os.close(directory)
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class Transition:
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def __init__(self, host=None, now=time.monotonic, security=None):
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from .security import Security
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self.host = host or Host()
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self.security = security if security is not None else Security(self.host)
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self.now = now
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self.directory = self.host.path('/var/lib/apex-init/access')
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def load(self):
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path = self.directory / 'state.json'
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return json.loads(path.read_text()) if path.exists() else None
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def save(self, state):
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atomic(self.directory / 'state.json', json.dumps(state, sort_keys=True).encode())
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def execute(self, operation, token=None, original_port=None, client_address=None):
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# Rollback must never wait for a stalled enrollment stage holding init.lock.
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if operation in ('tick', 'rollback'):
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return self._execute(operation, token, original_port, client_address)
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from .state import ProvisionError, exclusive_lock
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try:
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with exclusive_lock(self.host.path('/var/lib/apex-init/init.lock')):
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return self._execute(operation, token, original_port, client_address)
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except ProvisionError as error:
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raise AccessError(str(error)) from None
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def _execute(self, operation, token=None, original_port=None, client_address=None):
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if token is not None and not re.fullmatch(r'[a-f0-9]{32}', token):
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raise AccessError('Invalid access transition token')
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for path in [self.directory, *self.directory.parents]:
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if path.is_symlink():
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raise AccessError('Invalid access state directory')
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self.directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
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if self.directory.stat().st_uid != os.geteuid():
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raise AccessError('Access state directory is not owned by the provisioner user')
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os.chmod(self.directory, 0o700)
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descriptor = os.open(self.directory / 'lock', os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_NOFOLLOW, 0o600)
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with os.fdopen(descriptor, 'w') as lock:
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fcntl.flock(lock, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
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state = self.load()
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if state and state['status'] == 'recovery_pending':
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self._rollback(state)
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if operation != 'tick':
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raise AccessError('Pending recovery completed; retry initialization')
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return {'status': 'rolled_back'}
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pending = state and state['status'] in ('transition', 'final')
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if pending and (self.now() >= state['deadline'] or self.host.boot_id() != state['boot_id']):
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self._rollback(state)
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if operation != 'tick':
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raise AccessError('Uncommitted access transition expired or rebooted; previous access restored')
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return {'status': 'rolled_back'}
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if operation == 'tick':
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return {'status': state['status'] if state else 'absent'}
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if operation == 'begin':
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if pending:
|
|
raise AccessError('A pending access transition exists; wait for rollback before retrying')
|
|
if not token or not original_port or not 1 <= original_port <= 65535:
|
|
raise AccessError('Access transition requires an original port and token')
|
|
try:
|
|
ipaddress.ip_address(client_address)
|
|
except ValueError:
|
|
raise AccessError('Invalid SSH client address') from None
|
|
self.host.preflight()
|
|
path = self.host.path('/etc/systemd/system/ssh.service.d/apex-init.conf')
|
|
preserve_policy = False
|
|
if state and state['status'] == 'committed':
|
|
if state['fingerprint'] != self.host.fingerprint():
|
|
raise AccessError('Committed access configuration changed; reconcile before retrying')
|
|
self.host.verify_active([2222], True, client_address)
|
|
if state.get('security'):
|
|
self.security.verify(state['security'])
|
|
return {'status': 'committed'}
|
|
preserve_policy = True
|
|
if original_port == 2222 and not path.exists() and self.host.current_final(client_address):
|
|
preserve_policy = True
|
|
security_state = self.security.snapshot(self.security.preflight(), original_port, client_address)
|
|
self.host.arm()
|
|
state = {'status': 'transition', 'token': token, 'deadline': self.now() + 300,
|
|
'boot_id': self.host.boot_id(), 'client_address': client_address,
|
|
'original_port': original_port, 'firewall_added': False,
|
|
'preserve_policy': preserve_policy, 'security': security_state,
|
|
'previous': base64.b64encode(path.read_bytes()).decode() if path.exists() else None}
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
try:
|
|
self.security.activate(state['security'], lambda value: self._save_security(state, value))
|
|
if not preserve_policy:
|
|
self.host.install_policy([original_port, 2222], False, client_address)
|
|
state['fingerprint'] = self.host.fingerprint()
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
self._rollback(state)
|
|
raise
|
|
return {'status': 'transition'}
|
|
if not state or (not pending and state['status'] != 'existing') or token != state['token']:
|
|
raise AccessError('No matching pending access transition')
|
|
if state['status'] == 'existing':
|
|
if operation == 'rollback':
|
|
state['status'] = 'rolled_back'
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
return {'status': 'rolled_back'}
|
|
raise AccessError('Legacy access verification lacks security activation; retry initialization')
|
|
if operation == 'rollback':
|
|
self._rollback(state)
|
|
return {'status': 'rolled_back'}
|
|
if state.get('fingerprint') != self.host.fingerprint():
|
|
raise AccessError('External SSH configuration changed; finalization stopped, rollback remains armed')
|
|
if operation == 'finalize':
|
|
if state['status'] != 'transition':
|
|
raise AccessError('Access transition is not ready for final policy')
|
|
try:
|
|
if not state.get('preserve_policy'):
|
|
self.host.install_policy([2222], True, state['client_address'])
|
|
self.security.finalize(state['security'], lambda value: self._save_security(state, value))
|
|
state['status'] = 'final'
|
|
state['fingerprint'] = self.host.fingerprint()
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
self._rollback(state)
|
|
raise
|
|
return {'status': 'final'}
|
|
if operation == 'commit' and state['status'] == 'final':
|
|
self.host.verify_active([2222], True, state['client_address'])
|
|
self.security.verify(state['security'])
|
|
state['status'] = 'committed'
|
|
self.save(state) # Timer observes this before it can restore anything.
|
|
self.host.disarm()
|
|
return {'status': 'committed'}
|
|
raise AccessError('Invalid access transition operation')
|
|
|
|
def _save_security(self, state, value):
|
|
state['security'] = value
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
|
|
def _rollback(self, state):
|
|
errors = []
|
|
if state.get('security'):
|
|
try:
|
|
self.security.restore(state['security'], lambda value: self._save_security(state, value))
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
errors.append('security')
|
|
if not state.get('ssh_restored'):
|
|
try:
|
|
self.host.restore(state)
|
|
state['ssh_restored'] = True
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
errors.append('ssh')
|
|
if errors:
|
|
state['status'] = 'recovery_pending'
|
|
state['recovery_errors'] = errors
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
raise AccessError('Recovery remains pending for ' + ', '.join(errors) +
|
|
'; watchdog remains armed; inspect the root-owned access record')
|
|
state['status'] = 'rolled_back'
|
|
state.pop('recovery_errors', None)
|
|
self.save(state)
|
|
self.host.disarm()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main(argv=None):
|
|
from .security import SecurityError
|
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
|
|
parser.add_argument('operation', choices=['preflight', 'begin', 'finalize', 'commit', 'rollback', 'tick'])
|
|
parser.add_argument('--token')
|
|
parser.add_argument('--original-port', type=int)
|
|
parser.add_argument('--client-address')
|
|
args = parser.parse_args(argv)
|
|
if os.geteuid() != 0:
|
|
parser.error('Access handover requires root')
|
|
try:
|
|
if args.operation == 'preflight':
|
|
Host().bootstrap_preflight()
|
|
result = {'status': 'prerequisites-verified'}
|
|
else:
|
|
result = Transition().execute(args.operation, args.token, args.original_port, args.client_address)
|
|
print(json.dumps(result))
|
|
return 0
|
|
except (AccessError, SecurityError) as exc:
|
|
print(str(exc), file=sys.stderr)
|
|
return 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
|
sys.exit(main())
|