Adversarial parity review of every ported action against its bash source confirmed 17 real behavioral drifts (of 22 claimed); all fixed here: - tiers/chown: defaults were compositions/apex/tierN (one level too deep); now the tier roots. shared/ base reset is non-recursive again. - compose: --dry-run was swallowed by argparse.REMAINDER; now stripped. - host.write_file: rendered files land 0644 (tempfile's 0600 made fresh systemd units/crowdsec configs owner-only). - systemd.deploy_units: top-level non-hidden files only. - ufw: missing docker/host config dir exits 66; missing /etc/ufw target aborts; empty rules dir warns; dotfile .rules excluded. - sync/packages: Telegram error-trap parity and failed notify exits 1. Same notify-failure exit for backup/run and sync/repository. repository regains the node-dir guard. - tiers/useradd: no more secret-bearing .env.bak per run. - tiers/link: EOF on confirm prompt declines and continues. - extract-traefik-certs: sudo mkdir inside the notify envelope. - generate-happ-subscriptions: realpath parent-exists guards + docker check. - configure/crowdsec: bouncer install goes through install_packages. - lint-docker-compose: malformed/unreadable anchor-IP inputs are lint errors. - core compose: APEX_RESTIC_REPOSITORY now ?error; RESTIC_COMPRESSION per-node via APEX_RESTIC_COMPRESSION (default auto). - sys.service_exists line-anchored; tpl docstring corrected.
66 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
66 lines
3.1 KiB
Python
# actions/tiers/chown.py
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"""Port of tiers/chown — ownership: {tier}/{proj} -> uid:gid; {tier}/shared/{proj} ->
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uid:shared_gid (+sticky); base/node-infra -> root:root. Reads APEX_UID/GID from each .env."""
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import os
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from engine.descriptor import Meta, Arg
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METADATA = Meta(summary="Apply tier ownership/permissions from each project's APEX_UID/GID/.env.",
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args=[Arg("tier1_path", "Path to tier 1", required=False),
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Arg("tier2_path", "Path to tier 2", required=False),
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Arg("tier3_path", "Path to tier 3", required=False)])
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SHARED_GROUP = "noroot-shared"
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def _env_val(path, key):
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if not os.path.exists(path):
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return ""
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for line in open(os.path.realpath(path)):
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line = line.strip()
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if line.startswith(key + "="):
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return line.split("=", 1)[1].strip()
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return ""
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def run(ctx, args):
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log, s = ctx.log, ctx.sys
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comp = ctx.paths.compositions
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# Defaults are the TIER ROOTS (compositions/@tierN, bash $ROOT_TIERn) — NOT
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# ctx.paths.tierN, which is the apex core project's data dir one level deeper.
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tiers = [os.path.realpath(args.tier1_path or ctx.paths.root_tier1),
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os.path.realpath(args.tier2_path or ctx.paths.root_tier2),
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os.path.realpath(args.tier3_path or ctx.paths.root_tier3)]
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cp = s.run(["getent", "group", SHARED_GROUP], check=False, capture=True)
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if cp.returncode != 0:
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log.error(f"Shared group '{SHARED_GROUP}' not found. Run tiers/useradd first."); raise SystemExit(1)
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log.info("Ensuring base structures owned by root...")
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for tp in tiers:
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s.sudo(["chown", "root:root", tp])
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shared = os.path.join(tp, "shared")
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if os.path.isdir(shared): # dir inode only — recursing would clobber
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s.sudo(["chown", "root:root", shared]) # skipped projects' shared subtrees
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infra = os.path.join(tp, "node-infra")
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if os.path.isdir(infra):
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s.sudo(["chown", "-R", "root:root", infra])
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for proj in sorted(os.listdir(comp)):
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full = os.path.join(comp, proj)
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if not os.path.isdir(full) or proj.startswith(".") or proj.startswith("@"):
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continue
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env_path = os.path.join(full, ".env")
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uid = _env_val(env_path, "APEX_UID")
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gid = _env_val(env_path, "APEX_GID")
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sgid = _env_val(env_path, "APEX_SHARED_GID")
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if not (uid and gid and sgid):
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log.warn(f"Incomplete APEX_UID/GID/SHARED_GID for {proj}. Run tiers/useradd first. Skipping.")
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continue
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log.info(f"Applying permissions for {proj} (UID={uid} GID={gid} SHARED_GID={sgid})")
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for tp in tiers:
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pdir = os.path.join(tp, proj)
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sdir = os.path.join(tp, "shared", proj)
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if os.path.isdir(pdir):
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s.sudo(["chown", "-R", f"{uid}:{gid}", pdir]); log.success(f" Owned {pdir}")
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if os.path.isdir(sdir):
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s.sudo(["chown", "-R", f"{uid}:{sgid}", sdir])
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s.sudo(["chmod", "+t", sdir]); log.success(f" Owned {sdir} (sticky)")
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log.success("Permissions applied.")
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